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UNIVERSALITY, TRUTH, AND POPPERIAN SIMPLICITY 
Iñaki Xavier Larrauri Pertierra 
Abstract 
Popper’s account of science is an endeavour in establishing the relationship between 
universality and truth. The idea is that the more an empirical law is universal, by precluding 
certain realities from obtaining in an evidentially falsifiable way, the more the law is supported 
by instances of its predictions being evidentially verified. The logical structure of this dynamic 
is captured by Popper’s notion of ‘corroboration’. However, this notion is suspect, for, 
depending on one’s interpretation of evidential givenness, the relation between a law’s degree 
of universality and evidential corroborability could instead invert, thereby contradicting 
Popper. This paper also explores how a conceptualization of universality in terms of necessary 
simplicity – i.e., a measure of simplicity that is also sensitive to the evidence at hand – can 
better recontextualize evidential givenness to be about evidential support for a theory’s 
predictive truth conduciveness, against Popper’s understanding of evidential support for a 
theory’s veracity concerning the evidence at hand. However, it is argued that employing 
necessary simplicity to attain truth conduciveness in a theory’s predictions must appeal to 
specific background assumptions concerning the state of affairs the evidence is supposed to be 
about. When these background assumptions are denied as being necessarily instantiated, then 
a relation between necessary simplicity and truth conduciveness becomes contingently 
uncertain. 
Keywords: Popper, Universality, Simplicity, Falsification, Truth, Corroboration 
1. Introduction 
In The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Popper details a deductive science that is meant 
to counteract some of the pressing issues beleaguering sciences based on induction, primarily 
in regards to inductive justification of empirical theories.1 An important outcome of Popper’s 
goal for a deductive science is his identification of simpler theories as the more falsifiable ones, 
and how a theory’s falsifiability conditions its extent of evidential support – what he calls a 
 
1 For a brief overview of his qualms with induction, see, Popper (1992, pp. 28-9, 35). The main source 
for Popper’s thought throughout this essay is his book, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, which, through its 
multiple reprints, corrections, and additions, acts as an up to date version of Popper’s general and mature 
perspective on science. 
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theory’s corroborability. Relatedly, for Popper, a simpler theory is also a more universal one, 
in that the scope of the world about which it is meant to be is greater than more complex 
theories. Popper therefore relates universality and falsifiability in this way: the more potential 
falsifiers a theory has, the more extensive its empirical content is and the more it has to say 
about the world.  
This relation, being one of verisimilitude whereby universality becomes a measure of a 
theory’s truth conduciveness, is problematic due to features of its deductive structure 
concerning how Popper understands the nature of evidential givenness and its probabilistic 
support for the veracity of empirical laws. To appreciate this problem, we first outline Popper’s 
concept of testability and falsifiability (Section 2), as well as how it is associated with 
universality (Section 3), before explaining how universality relates to his notion of evidential 
corroboration (Section 4). Issues surrounding this comprehension of Popper’s argument are 
subsequently brought up (Sections 5 & 6) before discussing how a recent attempt at reviving a 
workable link between simplicity and truth conduciveness does not fare much better 
epistemically than Popper’s own account (Section 7). We then offer concluding remarks 
(Section 8). 
2. Popper on empirical testability and falsifiability 
Popper (1992) reasons that one of the components of a genuine deductive science is 
“the testing of [a] theory by way of empirical applications of the conclusions which can be 
derived from it” (pp. 32-33). Empirical testability in theories, for Popper, is closely tied to his 
understanding of scientific objectivity, for if we regard scientific theories as being composed 
of ‘objective’ scientific statements, then Popper would argue that these statements’ objectivity 
“lies in the fact that they can be inter-subjectively tested” (p. 44). In other words, scientific 
statements must be neither so idiosyncratic and esoteric as to be resistant to testing nor regarded 
as so self-evident that testing would be pointless. According to Popper, 
inter-subjective testability always implies that, from the statements which are to be tested, other 
testable statements can be deduced. Thus if the basic statements in their turn are to be inter-
subjectively testable, there can be no ultimate statements in science: there can be no statements 
in science which cannot be tested, and therefore none which cannot in principle be refuted, by 
falsifying some of the conclusions which can be deduced from them (p. 47). 
In short, “every scientific statement must remain tentative for ever” (p. 280). 
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This conclusion applies even to logical tautologies, which can be regarded as untestable 
and thus true simply by virtue of meaning. Popper (1992), in this sense, ends up disavowing 
“the view that there are statements in science which we have, resignedly, to accept as true 
merely because it does not seem possible, for logical reasons, to test them.” (p. 48)2 This 
mandate on wholesale testability for science can also be viewed as the reason why Popper 
insists that scientific laws “cannot be logically reduced to elementary statements of experience 
. . . [that are also] irrevocably true statements” (pp. 36-37). This is because what is meaningful 
for science is what allows for experientially testable statements/predictions that are not 
irrevocable, either by experience or meaning, in their truth value (p. 33).3 
Scientific testability then, for Popper, is a property of statements indicating their 
falsifiability, since tests can produce negative results that falsify some test statement. This 
concept of falsifiability is integral for Popper, to the point wherein he takes “not the verifiability 
but the falsifiability of a system [of statements] . . . as a criterion of demarcation [for science]” 
(1992, p. 40). This criterion demarcates non-falsifiable universal statements, along with 
verifiable although non-falsifiable singular, i.e., non-universal, statements, from falsifiable 
 
2 Popper (1992) explains that the logical necessity of tautologies can only apply if they are “true in all 
possible worlds” (p. 432). Furthermore, how we normally justify a tautology’s logical necessity is if, at least for 
Popper, the negation of a tautology would lead “to an obvious contradiction” (p. 429). However, if the concluded 
contradiction is based on the prior formulation of the tautology in question, then affirming that the tautology is 
logically necessary would be tantamount to arguing in a circle: a tautology is necessary based on its negation 
being contradictory, and this contradiction in turn is based on the tautology being necessary. We may instead 
replace ‘necessary’ with ‘true’ to appeal to the fact that a contradiction can simply be based on the establishment 
of a law as true, not necessarily as necessarily true, but this leads to an obvious problem: if we can replace 
‘necessary’ with ‘true’ and thereby change the character of a tautology from ‘necessarily true’ to ‘true but not 
necessarily true’, then we have no principled way of certainly knowing that some tautology is necessarily true 
rather than not. Popper acknowledges this issue and interprets it as indicating that, if necessary truth entails being 
true in all possible worlds, then any necessarily true statement can never be known as such, because “we cannot 
search all worlds that differ from ours” (p. 433). In this way, Popper follows Quine (1963) in ascribing to 
tautologies the feature of falsifiability rather than analytic necessity. 
3 For Popper (1992), “observation is always observation in the light of theories, [and] it is the inductivist 
prejudice which leads people to think that there could be a phenomenal language [that is] free of theories” (p. 59n; 
Cf., pp. 111, 423). Thus, what is meaningful for science are the empirical observations that are meaningfully 
conditioned by theory. Now, whatever may be said about the theory-independent facets of such observations, 
Popper merely considers these facets as irrelevant for his brand of science (pp. 99, 107). A helpful distinction 
between theory-conditioned observation and theory-independent observation can be derived from the discussion 
of theory-laden phenomenon and non-theory-laden data found in Bogen and Woodward (1988). 
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universal statements.4 Said in another way, scientific theories, in Popper’s view, deal only with 
falsifiable universal statements because science is interested in testable explanation, not mere 
description (Cf., p. 59n and §85).5 Moreover, given that from a system of statements other 
testable statements can be deduced (Cf., pp. 47, 60), we may say that the former statements 
help explain the latter ones. Popper further justifies why falsifiability, not verifiability, counts 
for science by noting that “an asymmetry between verifiability and falsifiability” of universal 
statements exists due to their “logical form” (p. 41): universal statements “are never derivable 
from singular statements, but can be contradicted by singular statements. Consequently it is 
possible by means of purely deductive inferences to argue from the truth of singular statements 
to the falsity of universal statements” through the use of modus tollens (p. 41), but never from 
the truth of singular statements to the truth of universal statements (p. 70n*2), as this would 
entail the fallacy of affirming the consequent. As such, from Popper’s argument, if we are 
committed to a science that deals with explanation via universal statements, then falsifiability, 
not verifiability, is a necessary part of said science, for, among the two, only falsifiability is an 
obvious property of universal statements. 
This is not to say that explanation occurs by way of deduction from one universal 
statement to some prediction, but from an initial group, or system of statements one can deduce 
testable predictions. This ‘group’ consists of the aforementioned universal statements as well 
as “singular statements” acting as the initial conditions that permit the derivation of testable 
“singular prediction[s]” (Popper 1992, p. 60; Cf., p. 101n).6 Popper acknowledges this, which 
is why, for him, scientific theories, consisting of universal statements, can never be 
 
4 Popper’s conception of universality is explicated in Section 3. 
5 Popper’s science thus is a form of falsificationism. For an additonal account of the relevance of 
falsification for science, see Medawar (1969). Nonetheless, for Popper, although metaphysical systems may help 
explain phenomena, they are not falsifiable; also, although non-falsifiable singular statements may deal with 
phenomena, they do not go past them as explanations since they cannot be tested. Consequently, Popper’s line 
between falsifiability and non-falsifiability is not that between synthetic and analytic statements, for while analytic 
statements are by definition empirically non-falsifiable, some synthetic statements can also be non-falsifiable in 
a practical way. For example, a non-falsifiable synthetic statement could be of the form, ‘X is an experienceable 
property of Y in possible worlds besides our own.’ Here, although X is in principle a testable property, since it 
can be experienced, X is in practice untestable if ‘possible worlds besides our own’ is regarded as ‘possible worlds 
we cannot get to’ (Cf., Popper 1992, p. 40n*3). 
6 Indeed, consistent with Popper, one cannot deduce testable predictions from universal statements alone, 
for the statements that are so deducible are hypothetical ones that still need initial conditions fulfilling their 
antecedent conditions in order to give concrete consequences that can then be tested. 
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conclusively falsified (p. 50), as there is always the chance for a falsified prediction to be due 
to the singular statements representing the set of testable initial conditions, not to the theory 
itself.7 Henceforth, we will disregard the influence that initial conditions have on the 
falsifiability of deduced predictions, primarily because, as we will see, there are problems even 
with Popper’s understanding of the relationship between a theory’s universal statements and 
their derived singular predictions that have not yet been falsified.8 To prime the discussion on 
these problems, we must first explore further what Popper means by ‘universality’. 
3. Popper on the universality of laws 
In general, universality for Popper (1992) is meant to express the extent to which a 
statement’s referenced class of entities – i.e., the entities the statement is supposed to be about 
– can be falsified (p. 141). To understand this concept, we must do some housekeeping. 
First, consider that a consequence of science dealing with universal statements and 
having ‘no ultimate statements’ is that scientific “theories are tested by deducing from them 
statements of a lesser level of universality. These statements in their turn, since they are to be 
inter-subjectively testable, must be testable in like manner – and so ad infinitum” (Popper 1992, 
p. 47). Presumably, for Popper, this infinite testability implies that deduced singular predictions 
are universal in nature as well, albeit to a lesser extent than those statements from which said 
predictions had been derived. However, if singular predictions – as in, singular statements 
derived from more universal statements – are universal in character, then how can they still be 
 
7 This answers Putnam’s claim that Popper does not pay sufficient attention to the interaction between 
the scientific theories and “auxiliary statements” from which predictions are derived (Putnam 1991, p. 126; Cf., 
§10). 
8 Additionally, if we consider that scientific theories can be composed of multiple universal statements, 
then the falsification of a derived prediction from one of these statements, in tandem with some set of initial 
conditions being held as true, would not necessarily falsify the whole theory, but only “some part of it” (Popper 
1992, p. 72). Moreover, if the falsified prediction was derived from a combination of universal statements, then 
“we cannot at first know which among the various [universal] statements . . . we are to blame for the falsity of 
[said conclusion]; which of these statements we have to alter, and which we should retain” (p. 76n2). Restated, 
this uncertainty “is possible . . . [only when] the connections between [a theory’s] various parts [have] yet [to] be 
sufficiently clear to enable us to decide which of its [parts] are affected by some particular falsifying observation” 
(p. 72). In any case, whether a change in initial conditions, the whole theory, or just some part thereof, is warranted, 
given a falsifying test result, may be decided upon by whichever change, or even combination of changes, arrives 




singular? According to Popper, even the most singular of statements can contain universal 
elements, even statements describing properties of individual entities, for insofar as these 
properties are said to be shared between multiple entities, then these properties would exhibit 
some universal designation – i.e., based on the logic of universals espoused by Popper, shared 
properties expressed by a singular statement describing an individual make that statement an 
inter-subjectively testable one (Cf., p. 425, and §14).  
Effectively, if a statement contains universal designations, even for simple sentences 
like, ‘here is a glass of water’, then such a statement “cannot be verified by any observational 
experience . . . [because] the universals which appear in it cannot be correlated with any 
specific sense-experience” (Popper 1992, p. 95). Popper can make this conclusion by appealing 
to the idea that universal designations in statements never describe individuals but the 
“universal class of all those individuals to which these [designations] belong” (p. 66). 
Moreover, if we consider that ‘universal class’ refers to a potentially infinitely membered class 
– in general, a universal class is one of indefinite size – then Popper would argue that “whether 
there are any individual things corresponding to [this universal class], and if so how many, 
must always remain an open question” (p. 66). It is only when a designation in a statement is 
made to refer to a finite class of individuals that the designation stops being universal in 
character, but then this would entail that the members of the finite class are therefore already 
known – the opposite of Popper’s argument that the members of an indefinite class cannot be 
known. This is due to the fact that it is precisely because universals refer to classes whose 
members are indefinite in extent and thus potentially infinite in size that such classes are not 
pre-emptively known – once classes are made to correspond to a finite number of individuals, 
it can only be because a finite number of members are already known in advance to belong to 
the class.9  
This fact of the non-verifiability of statements with universal designations by any 
individual observation can further explain Popper’s conception that universal statements can 
only be falsified by singular statements. Here, a statement with a universal designation can 
only be confirmed through the potentially infinitely sized classes to which they refer. However, 
let us consider that the truth of universal and singular statements are validated differently 
regarding their corresponding referential classes – universal statements require all members of 
 
9 The case of statements with non-universal designation will not be covered in detail within this paper. 
For a discussion, see Popper (1992, pp. 95, 111n) and Note 12. 
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the class for verification while singular statements, specifically observation statements of 
individual entities, require only one member. Regardless of Popper’s qualms concerning how 
an individual member of a class can be said to be confirmed as a member of that class for 
verification of an observation statement of that individual, as long as we accept that this 
member is a part of that class, then its corresponding observation statement can falsify any 
universal statement precluding membership of the individual to that same class. What is thus 
entailed by this relation of verifiability and falsifiability between universal and singular 
statements is that only in principle are such statements both falsifiable and verifiable, as long 
as an observation statement with the appropriately sized reference class is employed, for in 
practice they are only falsifiable and not verifiable. 
To arrive at Popper’s relation between universality and falsifiability, we must introduce 
statements that are in principle falsifiable yet in practice unfalsifiable. Let us begin by 
comparing two different statement forms that are both principledly falsifiable, yet one is 
practically unfalsifiable while the other is not: strictly universal and strictly existential 
statements. Strictly universal (SU) statements are ‘all statements’, such as, ‘all ravens are 
black’, while strictly existential (SE) statements are ‘there-is/are statements’, such as, ‘there 
are black ravens’, or, ‘there is at least one black raven’ (Cf., Popper 1992, §15). Both SU and 
SE statements are valid across all possible worlds (§13),10 and the reason why is clear: none of 
these statements specify in which world one can find black ravens – even the statement, ‘there 
is at least one black raven’ allows for at least one black raven in one of the possible worlds, 
meaning that in every possible world there is a non-zero probability of finding at least this one 
black raven. Furthermore, given that every scientific statement is testable, in Popper’s view, 
then both SU and SE statements must be falsifiable – i.e., predictions must be deducible from 
the combination of some SU or SE statement and a statement expressing a set of initial 
conditions (§28).11 Such predictions must in turn be falsifiable themselves if they are, by modus 
tollens, to be capable of falsifying whatever SU or SE statement they derive from. However, 
 
10 Numerically universal statements on the other hand, which Popper does not regard as of ideal scientific 
universality, are those statements that are only valid in either some possible worlds or, more restrictedly, a 
particular spatiotemporal region within our world. 
11 SE statements have the same relation to Popper’s ‘Basic Statements’ that SU statements have to 




while SU statements can be falsified, SE statements are only principledly falsifiable, meaning 
they are practically unfalsifiable.12 
To see how, note that the SU statement, ‘all ravens are black’ – let us call this, SU-R – 
can be falsified by a singular statement expressing the observation of a white raven,13 yet the 
SE statement, ‘there is at least one black raven’, cannot – let us call this statement, SE-R. To 
falsify this SE-R, one would have to apprehend the set of all ravens to see if there is not at least 
one black raven in it – i.e., falsification of SE-R comes about when a universal observation 
statement comprehends the set of all ravens with only non-black ones. Since this set is 
potentially infinite in size, only one with an infinite experiential capacity can know for sure 
that they have indeed apprehended the set of all ravens. Consequently, in principle SE 
statements can be falsifiable, but in practice they are not for beings with finite experiential 
capacities (Cf., Popper 1992, p. 69).14 In relation to testable predictions, we can predict, given 
SU-R, and the statement expressing some set of initial conditions, ‘there is a raven at 
spatiotemporal location k’, that there are no non-black ravens at k. This prediction can therefore 
be falsified by the observation of some non-black raven at k. Importantly, a statement of initial 
conditions is essential here for the derivation of the prediction. For instance, we cannot 
immediately derive, from SU-R, SE-R as a prediction, for the latter implies that ravens exist, 
while the former SU statement does not necessarily. In other words, to derive SE-R, SU-R must 
 
12 Popper (1992) is sometimes not clear in this regard though, for he claims, in one place, that “universal 
statements are falsifiable only and existential statements verifiable only” (p. 70n*2). However, this contradicts his 
latter claim that existential statements are testable, and thus also falsifiable, albeit only in principle (p. 104). To 
reconcile this seeming contradiction, we can split Popper’s use of “existential statements” into two camps: those 
that are principledly falsifiable yet practically unfalsifiable, and those that are principledly unfalsifiable yet also 
verifiable. The former case is being discussed here, while the latter case contains those synthetic statements Popper 
regards as employing non-universal designations. These describe a finitely sized class of referent individuals that 
are given as verified through immediate connection with a singularly unique experience (p. 95). 
13 However, falsification of SU statements can only occur in a qualified sense. See Note 20. SU 
statements are moreover principledly verifiable, but practically unverifiable: confirming whether it is the case that 
all ravens are black would require experientially apprehending the set of all ravens, which in principle can be 
accomplished, but not in practice by finite beings, since the set of all ravens is potentially infinite given its 
indefinite size. 
14 This is what Popper means by the idea that SE statements can only be falsified by universal statements, 
since these statements comprehend universal sets. 
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be combined with a statement of an existential initial condition, such as, ‘there exist ravens’.15 
Now, SE-R is still falsifiable, although only in principle, and not in practice, as explained 
above, meaning that while it is still a prediction, it is one with an exceedingly low level of 
universality.16 
To see the differences in universality between SU-R and SE-R, consider what these 
statements forbid, i.e., what their potential falsifiers are. For SU-R, every iteration of possible 
colour distribution over the set of all ravens, except the one wherein all members are black, 
would falsify SU-R. However, for SE-R, every iteration of possible colour distribution over 
the set of all ravens, except the one wherein all members are black and those wherein at least 
one black raven is a member of the set, would falsify SE-R. In short, the set of potential 
falsifiers for SU-R is larger than that for SE-R: SU-R “prohibits more” than SE-R (Popper 
1992, p. 83), in the sense that “there will be more opportunities for [SU-R] to be refuted by 
experience [than for SE-R]” (pp. 112-113).17 
4. Falsifiability, corroboration, and positive empirical attribution 
Thus, for Popper, a statement’s universality increases in direct proportion to the size of 
its set of potential falsifiers. Additionally, more universal theories are more improbable than 
less universal ones, since more universal theories are more readily contradicted by empirical 
evidence, given that they have more potential falsifiers, than less universal ones.18 When some 
first theory contains more potential falsifiers than a second one, Popper (1992) regards this first 
theory as saying more “about the world of experience than the second theory, for it rules out a 
 
15 Although one can immediately derive from “all ravens are black” the conditional, “if there are ravens, 
they would be black”, yet, according to Popper (1992), this conditional is not a testable prediction (p. 101n). 
16 A specific existential statement with a higher degree of universality than SE-R is, ‘there are no non-
black ravens’. This statement has the same level of universality as SU-R, because both are compatible with there 
being no extant ravens at all, while SE-R is not. 
17 In this sense, even the singular statement, ‘there is a black raven here’, can in principle be falsified by 
whatever observation could constitute the set of potential falsifiers of said singular statement. In other words, it is 
an open possibility for the set of potential falsifiers for, ‘there is a black raven here’, to include any observation 
corresponding to, ‘there are no black ravens here’. This reasoning is also echoed, for example, in Huemer (2017, 
pp. 603-604). Interestingly, ‘there is a black raven here’ would not even be practically verifiable due to its use of 
universal designation by, for example, ‘black raven’, which in this case could only be verified by the experiential 
apprehension of the potentially infinite set of ‘black ravens’. 
18 From here on, following Popper, we will use improbability, universality, testability, and falsifiability 
in an interchangeable fashion. 
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larger class of [potential falsifiers]” (p. 113). In a simplified sense, the more a theory prohibits, 
the more of a chance one can speak of what the world is not. Surprisingly though, Popper does 
not stop here, for he even argues that the first theory would also convey a greater “amount of 
positive information about the world” and possess more empirical content than the second (p. 
41. Italics mine). It is here that a major contention with Popper’s thesis emerges: how can a 
highly improbable theory say anything positive about the empirical world, especially if it is 
intended to positively say more than less improbable theories? Indeed, according to Popper, 
the statement, ‘all ravens are black’, may have a near zero logical probability – its sole 
confirming instance would be when the set of all ravens, a potentially infinite set, contains only 
black ravens, while every other possible colour constitution for this set would count as a 
falsifier; if we then consider that a potentially infinite number of ravens can be colour 
composed in a potentially infinite number of ways, then the effective ratio of confirming to 
falsifying instances would potentially be one to infinity, entailing a logical probability 
approaching zero (Cf., p. 264n).19 
Popper elsewhere makes additional remarks regarding how scientists choose what 
counts as an instance of falsifying a prediction.20 Nonetheless, these considerations will not be 
 
19 This is similar to a criticism in Adolf Grünbaum (2013, pp. 23-30), wherein he argues that any idea of 
a theory’s positive empirical content wedded to its logical improbability is bound to fail. 
20 Popper (1992) notes that  
no conclusive disproof of a theory can ever be produced; for it is always possible to say that the 
experimental results are not reliable, or that the discrepancies which are asserted to exist between the 
experimental results and the theory are only apparent and that they will disappear with the advance of 
our understanding (p. 50).  
However, Popper still considers that theories can be rejected, but only for good reasons, which can range from 
the “replacement of the [theory] by another which is better testable, [to] the falsification of one of the 
consequences of the [theory]” (p. 54). Now, since falsification can never be conclusive, then any statement acting 
as a falsifying instance for a theory and its predictions can only be arrived at via a methodological decision (pp. 
108-111). Infinite testability in science does not mean, for Popper, that scientists must not accept basic statements 
as test reports of observations; it just means that any acceptance can only be provisional, i.e., contingent upon a 
lack of falsification of the accepted statement. It is in this sense that Popper is a conventionalist, ala Carnap (1937; 
1956), when the former states that acceptance of basic statements is a matter of practical choice, yet Popper’s 
conventionalism places focus more on the choice of singular statements rather than universal ones (Popper 1992, 
p. 109). Thus, we can interpret what Popper means with a theory being “better testable” than another: the better 
testable theory allows for more basic statements to be potentially accepted as falsifying instances of the better 
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outlined in detail, for what interests us is not a practical issue but a structural one: what makes 
a theory attain greater empirical content than others by mere virtue of their logical structure? 
In concomitance with his idea that more improbable theories tell us more about the world, 
Popper introduces his notion of ‘corroboration’ as a measure of how likely a theory coincides 
with the truth of the world’s state of affairs. Specifically, he calls a theory’s value of 
corroboration a measure of “how far it has been able to prove its fitness to survive by standing 
up to tests [i.e., attempts at falsification]” (Popper 1992, p. 251).21 Moreover, “[t]he appraisal” 
of a theory’s corroboration value makes no use of inductive measures, as the appraisal “can be 
derived [deductively from the structure of] the theory as well as the accepted basic statements 
. . . [that] do not contradict the theory” (p. 266).22  
This is not a controversial claim, for all that corroboration is meant to apply to is the 
assertion “that a certain logical relation holds between a theoretical system and some system 
of accepted basic statements” (Popper 1992, p. 275). In other words, a theory’s value of 
corroboration is not an absolute judgement, but a relative one, contingent upon an accepted 
system of basic statements – “a system accepted up to a particular point in time” (p. 275). 
Whenever basic statements, acting as a report of experimental results – i.e., singular 
observation statements – go against a theory’s singular predictions, that theory’s corroboration 
value decreases, while basic statements that coincide with said predictions help increase the 
theory’s value. Also, given two theories that have passed the same number of tests, the one 
with the greater universality and degree of testability will attain a higher corroboration value 
than the other theory (pp. 398-399). Lastly, Popper also makes mention of the severity of tests 
that apply to theories (p. 266), but the details of how a measure of severity ought to be 
constructed are not discussed in this essay, for what interests us is not how a severe test can 
potentially affect a theory’s corroboration value, but how any test that a theory does not fail 
 
theory. See Lakatos (1968, §2(c)) for a discussion. See, also, Persson (2016, p. 468), who explains this movement 
from one theory to a better testable one in terms of the former being embedded in the more fundamental theory 
that is the latter. 
21 Carnap (1945) also makes use of a theory’s fitness for his arguments of inductive justification in terms 
of a theory’s “success in some sense” (p. 96). 
22 Remember, as explained in Note 20, basic statements can only be accepted by convention. 
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can, in any way, indicate towards that theory’s greater empirical content and correspondence 
to the world’s state of affairs.23 
5. Universality does not guarantee truth 
Popper (1992) argues that, by allowing a more restricted field of empirical possibility, 
the more improbable theory coincides more with the structure of reality, as reality exhibits the 
most restricted field of empirical possibility possible, that being what is empirically true (Cf., 
§78).24 For Popper, the most improbable, and thus the most universal  
theory would describe “our particular world” as precisely as a theory can; for it would single 
out the world of “our experience” from the class of all logically possible worlds of experience 
with the greatest precision attainable by theoretical science. All [that] . . . we actually encounter 
and observe, and only these, would be characterized as “permitted” [by this theory] (p. 113). 
However, we can interpret Popper’s intention for this argument in two ways. The first is that if 
it were the most universal theory it would be automatically true; the second is that if it were 
true it would be the most universal one able to express that truth. These two ways are not 
identical, for the first guarantees that maximal improbability entails truth, while the second 
does not. Moreover, the first has some textual grounds: if we interpret universality as a measure 
of a theory’s ability to describe the regularities of experiential reality – the more universal the 
theory the more it corresponds with reality – then Popper’s belief, that “if no regularities were 
apparent in nature then neither observations nor language could exist” (p. 282),25 could be 
interpreted as saying that the fact that we can theorise implies that these apparent regularities 
exist and are best and most accurately represented through the most universal forms of 
theorisation, i.e., those that forbid the greatest extent of possible empirical regularities other 
than our own. Nevertheless, this first interpretation is doomed to fail. 
For example, let us consider again the universal hypothesis, ‘all ravens are black’ (SU-
R), and the situation wherein the basic statement, ‘there is a black raven here’, has been applied 
to every observation of a raven so far. According to Popper, SU-R’s corroboration value will 
increase with each acceptance of the basic statement for every instance of an observed black 
 
23 Popper (1992) at least acknowledges that what counts as a severe test cannot be “completely 
formalize[d]” (p. 402). 
24 This indicates Popper’s determinist bias. 
25 This is just one example of how Kant and Popper share philosophical commitments. For a deeper 
discussion, see Drieschner (2005). 
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raven. Nevertheless, given that we can never know the true size of the universal set of ‘raven’, 
since it is indefinite, we can never know whether, for each subsequent observation of a black 
raven, the rest of the set of ‘raven’ consists only of black ravens or not. We can also never 
know the probability of the rest of the ‘raven’ set being only black ravens even given the 
evidence that there have only been observations of black ravens so far, and this is also due to 
the potentially infinite size of the set – every observation of a black raven still leaves the rest 
of the ‘raven’ set as potentially infinitely sized, so we would never be able to know just how 
much more probable SU-R is given each observation of a black raven.26 
Even Bayesian probability formulations require that the distribution of some countable 
property be given for a set of entities before one can even begin to calculate the probability that 
any one of those entities has a particular instance of said property;27 this applies both to the 
absolute probability of an entity possessing a property instance within the set and to the relative 
probability of an entity possessing that instance given the observation of other entities with 
specific property instances from the set. Even if we replace ‘entity’ with ‘hypothesis’, as 
Popper does, since he is interested in the probability of hypotheses, not entities, given the 
evidence, we are still faced with the same problem: in the case of SU-R, it is just one hypothesis 
out of a potential infinitely sized set of hypotheses – let us call this the hypothesis-set – 
describing the possible colour distributions of the universal set of ‘raven’. As such, the absolute 
probability of SU-R, along with the relative probability of SU-R given observations only of 
black ravens, can only be known once the members of the hypothesis-set are known; and this 
itself can only be known once the size of the universal set of ‘raven’ is known to be finite, for 
otherwise a potentially infinitely sized ‘raven’ set would entail a potentially infinite number of 
hypotheses describing the potentially infinite variations of colour combinations of the ‘raven’ 
set. This would mean that absolute and relative probabilities for SU-R could never be pinned 
down as certain at the same time.28  
Popper explores other possibilities of interpreting probabilities for hypotheses, but he 
seems to conclude that one can only understand relative probabilities – probabilities given the 
 
26 For a discussion of this issue, see Appendix *IX in Popper (1992). 
27 Popper (1992) even partially bases his own probability systems, and thus corroboration formulations, 
on Bayesian considerations (Cf., p. 263n*). 
28 Accounts of absolute probabilities, especially Bayesian ones, are notoriously contentious (Huemer 
2017; 2019). One could though try and rescue absolute probabilities through an intuitionist approach, but 
analysing this method is outside the scope of this paper. For a discussion, see Huemer (2009). 
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evidence – once absolute probabilities – probabilities without consideration of the evidence – 
are established;29 but the establishment of, say, the absolute probability of SU-R requires a 
prior knowledge of the members that constitute the hypothesis-set, which, as we have argued 
for above, is impossible if the set is meant to be universal, i.e., indefinite. Therefore, we can 
never know just how true a universal hypothesis is given corroborating evidential instances; 
additionally, the situation is even worse for hypotheses more universal than SU-R, since these 
more universal hypotheses forbid more from being true than what SU-R does in its 
corresponding hypothesis-set, which undermines the validity of the first interpretation of 
Popper’s notion of the relation between maximal universality and truth. 
6. Truth does not guarantee universality 
Now, Popper does de-substantiate the first interpretation in other places. He for instance 
acknowledges that absolute probabilities for universal hypotheses may never be known (Popper 
1992, p. 417), and that any corroborating instance of a hypothesis “can [n]ever seriously 
reduce, by elimination, the number of the competing [hypotheses against it]” (p. 419). Indeed, 
Popper regards that in a potentially infinite universe there is no guarantee that experimental 
tests will ever establish the truth of any theory (Cf., p. 424n);30 yet a theory’s testability is still 
relevant for him, especially considering that veritable scientific growth for Popper follows a 
path of greater theoretical testability/universality (§85). Furthermore, we still have as a 
possibility the second interpretation of Popper’s notion of the relation between maximal 
universality/improbability and truth: if a hypothesis were true it would be the most universal 
one capable of expressing that truth. What this interpretation signifies, in combination with 
Popper’s idea of the path of scientific growth, is that, while maximal universality may not 
guarantee truth, there is still something about a theory’s degree of universality that makes a 
measure of universality our best hope for attaining empirical truth. How Popper argues for this 
is, again, through his idea of corroboration, wherein a theory’s universality is important, for 
theories with lower probabilities experience greater evidential support – i.e., they are 
corroborated more with positive non-falsifying tests than theories with higher probabilities, 
which can be measured via the different probability changes for these theories that occur 
 
29 See Popper (1992, pp. 415ff.) for a discussion on the relation between absolute and relative 
probabilities, given by Popper as primary and secondary probabilities, respectively. 




between such tests. It becomes clearer that Popper is arguing in this way when we analyse his 
use of examples showcasing how highly probable theories may still not be well corroborated 
by the evidence. 
One such example is as follows:31 consider a bag of four differently coloured balls, 
named either B, G, R, or Y. Consider also two theories, X1 and X2; X1 predicts that B will be 
picked from the bag, while X2 predicts that some not-R will be picked from the bag (either B 
or G or Y). Let us also assume that some not-Y (either B or G or R) had been picked from the 
bag previously, and let this be the evidence, Z. Now, it should be clear that, before Z takes 
place, p(X1) = 1/4, is less than that of p(X2) = 3/4. When Z does take place, the relevant 
probabilities shift, from p(X1) and p(X2) to p(X1|Z) and p(X2|Z), respectively, since now the 
probability of what colour the picked ball is has to depend on that ball being either B, G, or 
R;32 as such, p(X1|Z) = 1/3, is less than p(X2|Z) = 2/3. However, according to Popper, X1 is 
corroborated by Z, but X2 is undermined by Z, because the probability that B will be picked 
increases when not-Y is given – from 1/4 to 1/3 (a change of +1/12) – while the probability 
that some not-R will be picked decreases when not-Y is given – from 3/4 to 2/3 (a change of –
1/12). This means that what X1 says pertaining to the empirical reality of the picked ball is 
supported and substantiated more by the evidence than what X2 says about said reality. 
Additionally, since X1 is the more universal hypothesis – it is more improbable than X2 – its 
positive corroboration value, compared to the negative one of X2, given Z, gives weight to the 
argument that more universal hypotheses – the theories that forbid more possibilities – are 
supported more than less universal ones by the same evidence set. This allows Popper (1992) 
to conclude that the ability for any theory to be supported by the evidence – its ‘corroborability’ 
– “stands . . . in inverse ratio to its logical probability” (p. 270). 
However, the above illustration becomes misguided when alternative interpretations 
are made for what the givenness of evidence entails for theory support. In essence, if a theory 
is meant to represent the attainment of some property by a set of entities, such as the attainment 
of some colour by the set of four balls in a bag, then Popper’s illustration fails in this regard: 
X1 and X2 above do not consistently comment on the state of affairs of the bagged balls in the 
 
31 See Popper (1992, pp. 395-402) for full details of the example. 
32 P(X1|Z), or, the probability of X1 given Z, can have multiple interpretations (Hájek 2003; Lowe 2008; 
Schwarz 2018). However, since the important one to focus on here is what Popper uses, at least in this instance in 
the text, we will have to forego a detailed analysis of alternative interpretations. 
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above example, for once Z is given, their probabilities only apply to the not-Y ball picked from 
the bag – it is another thing entirely to have X1 and X2 refer to the colour composition of the 
bagged balls remaining once Z is given. Surprisingly, having this referral change occur ends 
up damaging Popper’s conclusion concerning corroboration’s relation to universality. To see 
how, let us make ‘X1 given Z’ and ‘X2 given Z’ refer to, after some not-Y ball is picked, a ball 
picked from the bag being B and some not-R, respectively. p(X1) and p(X2) remain the same 
– 1/4 and 3/4, respectively – but those for p(X1|Z) and p(X2|Z) change to 2/9 and 7/9, 
respectively.33 This entails that the probability change experienced by X1 and X2, once Z is 
given, is –1/36 and +1/36, respectively, meaning that, with this interpretation of evidential 
givenness, the more universal hypothesis is actually undermined by the same evidence that 
better corroborates the less universal one. 
Another example showcases more clearly how ‘corroborability’ does not necessarily 
correlate with universality. Take a set of two different entities, both of which have equal 
probability to attain either one of three states: B, R, or G. Let us have X1 = both entities are B, 
X2 = one entity is B and the other is G, X3 = both entities are either B or R, and Y = at least 
one of the entities is B. Logically speaking, X1, X2, and X3 have, respectively, these prior 
probabilities: 1/9, 2/9, and 4/9. X1 is thus the most universal/improbable hypothesis while X3 
is the least. Now, with the given evidence, Y, of one of the entities being B, we have the 
changed probabilities of X1, X2, and X3, once Y is given, respectively as follows: 1/5, 2/5, 
and 3/5. (From the evidence that at least one of the entities is B, four different possible 
descriptions of the state of both entities – R and G; G and R; G and G; R and R – become 
impossible.) Therefore, the changes in probability for X1, X2, and X3, once Y is given, are 
+4/45, +8/45, and +7/45, respectively. All that this indicates is that the most corroborated 
hypothesis – the one most evidentially supported by Y – is X2, and although X2 is indeed a 
more universal hypothesis than X3, which is corroborated less by Y, the least corroborated 
hypothesis is the most universal one out of the three, X1. 
7. Alternative Approaches 
 These examples notwithstanding, Popper’s notion of testability – i.e., theories that have 
survived more empirical tests than others are the better supported theories – is not such an 
 
33 The bagged balls, before Z is given, can be represented as: B,G,R,Y. Once (Z = not-Y = B or G or R) 
happens, what remains are three equi-possible states: (G,R,Y), (B,R,Y), or (B,G,Y). P(X1|Z) and P(X2|Z) are then 
both calculated from these three states. 
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unpalatable idea, for theories whose predictions have stood up to experimental scrutiny have 
often been valued highly in the sciences. The issue comes about when the idea of testability is 
wedded to probabilistic constructions of a theory’s degree of being true, either in terms of its 
prior Bayesian probability or in terms of Popper’s formulation of corroboration given the 
evidence.34 Glymour (1980), for example, may be taken as expressing this sentiment when 
arguing 
that the body of evidence that distinct theories hold in common . . . may nonetheless provide 
differing support for the two theories. . . . Not because one theory is a priori more plausible or 
probable than the other but, roughly, because one theory is better tested than the other by the 
body of evidence in question” (p. 342, italics mine). 
This is not to say that there cannot be a way in which one may reasonably argue for a theory’s 
degree of evidential support, just that the precise way in which this support is expressed is 
highly contingent upon one’s prior view of how the world is structured, of that which grants a 
theory its prior logical probability. This prior view is important, because whether a measure of 
a theory’s testability is considered truth-conducive depends on how complex the world is made 
out to be (Glymour 1980, p. 377). 
 The prior probabilities mentioned in the above example of Popper are used to inform 
his values of a theory’s evidential corroboration. However, we had uncovered that whether a 
more universal theory is better corroborated by the evidence is not solely contingent on the 
theory’s universality, given that there are cases wherein more probable theories can experience 
better evidential support than less probable ones. This result has been a major source of 
criticism towards Popper’s idea of corroboration, leading some, in their attempts at explicating 
the relation between a theory’s universality and its truth, to consider how corroboration may 
also be based on the evidence at hand. The idea is that the extent to which a theory’s measure 
of universality is truth-conducive is in part determined by a posteriori considerations, not just 
on its a priori ones (Cf., Sober 1994, p. 141).35 
 
34 For a related critique, see Niiniluoto (1987). 
35 Close approximations to Popper’s sense of universality have also employed this idea of truth-
conduciveness, for example, in terms of a theory’s parametric simplicity (Kelly 2007a, p. 113), theory-ladenness 
and dimensional simplicity (Rochefort-Maranda 2016, p. 271, §3.1), and explanatory and ontological parsimony 
(Long 2019, pp. 484-486). 
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 One such attempt is found in Kelly et al. (2016), which can be viewed as elaborating 
upon Popper’s notion of universality by, one, critiquing his relation between simplicity and 
falsifiability,36 and two, revising it in terms of a necessary simplicity. The basic critique is that 
a theory’s extent of possible falsifiers may be silent on the overall complexity of that theory. 
For instance,  
if general relativity theory GRT is falsifiable, then GRT ⋂ P has at least as many potential 
falsifiers as GRT — but P could be hopelessly complex, in which case the conjunction GRT ⋂ 
P appears to be more complex than GRT alone, contrary to Popper’s proposal” (Kelly et al. 
2016, p. 1207).  
GRT ⋂ P can be interpreted as dealing with at least as many predictions – i.e., potential 
falsifiers – yet being at least as permissive as GRT. Said in another way, a law that predicts A 
⋃ B is more complex in its structure and permissive in its predictions than one that predicts A 
⋂ ¬B, but only in relation to those predictions, because the former law could be less lenient, 
by having more falsifiers, in its other predictions than the latter one; this would be exemplified 
in GRT ⋂ P having more potential falsifiers than GRT alone.  
What then allows for the evaluation between GRT ⋂ P and GRT as the better theory 
must be based on subsequent empirical tests. It is this withholding of judgment until a time 
wherein one can empirically distinguish between two otherwise equivalent theories that is 
expressed, by Kelly et al. (2016), as the condition of patience for truth-optimized solutions of 
empirical problems (p. 1214). Indeed, it is this condition of patience that factors the most 
prominently in determining the truth conduciveness of a theory’s testable predictions for Kelly 
et al., since taking the condition to its logical conclusion results in a convergence “to the truth 
with no more reversals or cycles of opinion than are necessary for converging to the truth at 
all” (p. 1201). When convergence is reached, the future is methodologically connected to the 
past in the sense “that all future predictions are correct after convergence” (p. 1202). 
 Ideally, the above argument is tenable since we can take convergence as the point in 
which the set of entities that a theory is about is fully in concordance with that set as instantiated 
in reality. Here, the point of convergence is where, for example, SU-R (all ravens are black) is 
 
36 Kelly et al. (2016) use the term simplicity, but just keep in mind that whenever this term is used it is 
meant to express Popper’s notion of universality. This is because, for Popper, the less universal theories, being 
the more probable ones, are so due to their increased complexity allowing less falsifiers and permitting more states 
of affairs in the world.  
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in principle verifiable, as convergence would be on the actually instantiated set of ravens, 
whether it consists of all black ravens or not. The notion that there can be ‘no more reversals 
or cycles of opinion than are necessary for converging to the truth’ is meant to portray a 
methodology – what Kelly et al. (2016) define as constituting a learning method λ (p. 1200) – 
that is optimally truth conducive by being systematically biased “toward simple answers to an 
inductive problem”, that is, simple empirical theories (p. 1196).37 This bias towards simple 
theories is also patient in that the importance of a theory’s measure of simplicity must always 
be weighed in tandem with the results of empirical testing in order to avoid theories that are 
either too simple or too complex given the evidence at hand – i.e., not too simple that it predicts 
less than what is evidentially given and not too complex that it allows for more than what is 
evidentially given. 
We can now understand the abovementioned sense of necessary simplicity, as a relation 
between a theory’s simplicity and its predictive permissibility, in this way: the more permissive 
the theory, the less simple it is; the less permissive, the less of a chance for unnecessary opinion 
change (not based on evidence) and more of a chance for necessary opinion change (based on 
evidence) – unnecessary opinion changes are potentiated more in more permissive theories 
because these theories, by permitting more states of affairs in the world, disallow the type of 
evidence-based opinion shifts capacitated by less permissive theories. Therefore, the simpler 
the theory, the greater the chance for necessary opinion shifts and the greater any 
methodological bias to simplicity is in converging to the truth by minimizing unnecessary 
opinion shifts. In conclusion, given different incompatible theories, wherein the truth of one 
precludes the truth of the other, the process of rationally choosing between them is optimized 
in its truth conduciveness by favoring the less permissive theory given the evidence at hand. If 
two theories are equally permissive – e.g., one theory predicts an even number of basic 
elementary particles while the other predicts an odd number instead – then evaluation must 
wait for the results of subsequent empirical testing (Cf., Kelly et al. 2016, p. 1207). In short, 
opinion change must accord with evidential change if empirical truth is to be converged at by 
one’s method. 
 
37 The norm of avoiding unnecessary cycles or reversals of opinion is given more detailed expression in Kelly 
(2007b, 2011). This norm’s relation to simplicity has also been explicated in terms of Ockham’s razor by Kelly 
and Glymour (2004). 
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Popper’s troubles with associating simplicity with falsifiability are curtailed when one 
associates simplicity with evidence-based permissiveness – or, in other words, when one 
defines testability in terms of such permissiveness and not of falsifiability – since the amount 
of potential falsifiers that a theory has, being an evidence-independent measure, is a worse 
measure of evidential support than whether a theory permits more or less than what the 
evidence shows. Said in another way, a systematic bias towards simple theories optimizes a 
method’s truth conduciveness because all prior iterations of said method are refutable, meaning 
that, at any stage in the method, looking back at the progress of the method will always find 
instances of new evidence refuting some prior theory (Kelly et al. 2016, p. 1214). This bias is 
meant to conclude at a point of convergence with the truth wherein a theory’s experimental 
refutability becomes non-existent while its extent of unfalsifiable predictions is also 
minimized. The problem that is supposed to be avoided here is when all that is stopping a 
theory from converging on the truth is its set of predictions that can never be empirically 
adjudicated on because they are false yet unfalsifiable, regardless of how permissive a theory 
is in predicting the states of affairs for a world.38 
Nonetheless, there is a problem with this approach by Kelly et al., that being the issue 
of how one is to know that a prediction will remain unfalsifiable or not. Similarly, how can we 
tell once we have reached convergence? The condition of having ‘no more reversals or cycles 
of opinion than are necessary’ is unhelpful here, for how can we tell that we have reached the 
necessary number of reversals when it is entirely possible (epistemically) for one’s opinion to 
change drastically the next time an observation is made? Of course, having an empirical method 
follow the evidence as it is observed and be biased towards simple theories that minimize 
permittance past the evidence may be the best way to represent the evidence, but it does not 
seem to be any measure of truth past the evidence at hand. Here the argument in Kelly et al. 
(2016) faces similar issues with Popper’s, in which a potentially infinite set of entities cannot 
be exhaustively known concerning some property a universal theory attributes to it. This 
applies even to theories that are highly falsifiable, simple, whatever, as there is always the 
 
38 However, a weaker constraint may be allowed, whereby a viable theory can attain some unfalsifiable a priori 
components if these can help explain the empirical evidence at hand. This weaker constraint is derived from 
French’s Viking approach to scientific metaphysics (French 2014), although it is past the scope of this paper to 
discuss it in detail. 
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epistemic possibility that a theory will be falsified given future tests, even if that theory is true 
and can only ever predict veridically.  
Now, it can be argued that we can only know that we have arrived at convergence if we 
can know that the evidence will not be drastically different during future observations thereof. 
This latter knowledge is expressed, by Kelly et al. (2016, pp. 1193-1194) and Carnap (1945, 
pp. 96-97), as knowledge of a limit – think mathematical limit – at which convergence takes 
place. If the limit cannot be epistemically ascertained as instantiated in reality, then the best we 
can hope for is to presuppose it as a reasonable intuition when constructing our background 
theories of the world – e.g., the world is simple enough that a limit is possible (Cf., Glymour 
1980, p. 377). Sober (2009) even recognizes that the importance we ought to ascribe to 
structural measures of a theory (simplicity, falsifiability, universality, etc.) towards truth 
conduciveness “often should be viewed as expressi[ve] of subject-matter-specific background 
theories” (p. 238). As such, since these background theories are always subject to change 
because they must remain falsifiable to us, then even the background theory that there is a limit 
on which one can truthfully converge is falsifiable as well.  
In short, the fact that evidence appears to converge on some value is not any reliable 
measure that, one, the evidence will not diverge in the future, and two, reality is not actually 
divergent from the evidence at hand. Reliability, as a feature of a theory’s predictive capacities, 
is of value in theory choice often so much so that other structural measures – e.g., interpretive 
simplicity – may be willingly left by the wayside (Cf., James et al. 2013, p. 25). Moreover, 
reliability is a primary motivator in Kelly et al. (2016) for their appeal to simplicity bias in 
one’s method for theory choice as a guarantor of predictive truth-conduciveness. Therefore, 
the sense of reliability often appealed to for the formulation of empirical theories is primarily 
an ideal that becomes accurate as a descriptor of such theories only when situated within some 
background theoretical context, such as that specifying the existence of a converge-able limit. 
Whether these background theories are themselves reliable in their predictive truth 
conduciveness is another matter entirely. 
8. Conclusion 
In any case, the foregoing discussion on Popper’s espoused relation between 
universality and truth concludes that the relation is dubious at best. Thus, it seems as if all that 
Popper can validly say is that more universal theories posit more about what empirical reality 
is in a negative way, not a positive one – i.e., in the sense of what they forbid, as opposed to 
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what is. Indeed, this notion that more universal theories have greater positive empirical content, 
exhibited through the idea that they are corroborated more by empirical evidence than less 
universal ones, has motivated interpretations of Popper as optimistic in what he considers a 
deductive science to be capable of achieving (Veronesi 2014, §2). This optimism in Popper’s 
thought is grounded in his understanding of a theory’s corroborability as a function of its 
universality and falsifiability, but only when a theory is being applied to the evidence at hand, 
not to what state of affairs the evidence is meant to be about.  
However, whether Popper’s sense of corroboration – i.e., the greater support given by 
the evidence to simpler and more universal theories – pans out in the numbers depends on how 
the theory is being applied; a more falsifiable theory may be made more probable than a less 
falsifiable one, given the evidence, as a true theory about the evidence at hand, but not 
necessarily when the theory is made to be about the set of entities from which the evidence is 
derived, as discovered in Section 6. In effect, Popper constructs an empirical theory’s evidential 
support for what the theory has to say about what has already been evidentially unearthed, not 
specifically for the theory’s predictive power past what has been unearthed. Kelly et al.’s 
remedy of conceiving universality in terms of necessary simplicity, in an effort to more 
effectively conceive of predictive veracity as a function of an empirical method’s bias towards 
theory simplicity, may allow for a better sense of how a theory is justified for what is past the 
evidence at hand. Nevertheless, what is touted as being where the evidence will eventually lead 
to when such a method is followed – i.e., the convergence – is not epistemologically given. 
This implies that the idea of a convergence at which empirical truth is attained suffers from the 
same type of optimism that characterizes Popper’s own account, albeit in a way that is at least 
more sensitive to the evidence at hand. As a final lesson, we may say this: the justification that 
a theory attains by the evidence for the evidence is different than the justification by the 
evidence for the rest of the world – a difference which may at the end be impossible to spell 
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